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Abstract. In this work we compare two recent multiparty computation
(MPC) protocols for private summation in terms of performance. Both
protocols allow multiple rounds of aggregation from the same set of public
keys generated by parties in an initial stage. We instantiate the proto-
cols with a fast elliptic curve and provide an experimental comparison
of their performance for different phases of the protocol. Furthermore,
we introduce a technique that allows the computational load of both
protocols to be reduced at the expense of protection against collusion
tolerance. We prove that both protocols remain secure with this tech-
nique, and evaluate its impact on collusion tolerance and the number of
rounds supported.
Keywords: multiparty computation, private summation, custom collu-
sion tolerance, private aggregation
1 Introduction
Modern computing has reached a point that allows users from every part of the
globe to exchange information seamlessly. Nevertheless, the environment cannot
be considered friendly. Cyber attacks each year are reaching a new peak, while
recently disclosed events clearly indicate that privacy measures are not properly
deployed or applied. The hostile environment to which modern users are exposed
to has triggered the generation of many security and privacy protocols. In many
scenarios, users have to co-operate to perform several tasks which result in some
of their data being partially or fully exposed. Since the latter might not be an
acceptable option, given the sensitivity of the submitted information, there has
been much research effort in the area of secure multi-party computation (MPC).
While there has been much progress made in recent years towards making
MPC practical, the efficiency of many protocols is still not acceptable for many
real-world applications. To cover this gap, apart from general MPC protocols
(which allow any function to be computed), many MPC protocols for special-
ized computations have been introduced. While they might support only a small
1The author’s work is funded by the Irish Research Council EMBARK Initiative.
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set of functions, these protocols can be obtain much improved performance,
even in devices with limited computing resources. Thus, apart from the interest
in general MPC protocols, many application needs are pushing towards the de-
velopment of more targeted MPC protocols. A typical example of this trend are
protocols which allow privacy-aware summation of values. These protocols are
widely used for load monitoring of smart meters, privacy-aware participatory
sensing, and generally for submitting time series data with privacy.
Recently, a new protocol was proposed by Patsakis, Clear and Laird [26]
(referred to here as PCL) that allows privacy-aware multiparty aggregation of
values. A notable feature is that it supports multiple rounds of aggregation
from the same set of public keys published by the users, and it relies only on
the standard Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. PCL is based on
a protocol due to Kursawe, Danezis and Kohlweiss [20] (referred to here as
KDK) which also has a variant that supports multiple rounds of aggregation by
exploiting bilinear pairings. Both these papers do not consider the performance of
their protocols in practice. In fact, [26] does not address its performance relative
to multi-round KDK. In this paper, we extensively compare the performance of
both protocols, and show that in practice PCL outperforms multi-round KDK
by a significant margin, largely due to the cost of pairings, but also due to the
larger finite field in which recovery of the sum takes place. Following on from
concrete performance results, we propose a new extension that is applicable to
both protocols, which leads to considerable performance improvements. In PCL,
protection against collusion tolerance is traded off against the number of rounds
supported. Our extension trades collusion tolerance further (in both protocols)
to achieve a performance gain. However, since a tolerance of 1/3−1 of the parties
is satisfactory for many real-world applications (note that this corresponds to the
Byzantine optimum), we argue that reducing tolerance to (say) 1/3 is justified
given the significant gains in performance.
1.1 Main contributions
The main technical contribution of this work are as follows. Firstly, a thorough
performance analysis is given of the multi-round protocols PCL and KDK. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first assessment of the practicality of multi-
round KDK. Secondly, we introduce a new technique that is applicable to both
protocols that allows all parties to reduce their computational load by adjusting
their collusion tolerance. We prove security for the extended versions of both
protocols that employ this technique.
1.2 Organization of this work
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a
brief overview of the related work in this area, along with a description of the
two protocols, PCL and KDK in their single-round and multi round versions.
Afterwards, in section 3, we compare the performance of the two protocols.
Sections 4 and five describe methods to reduce the computational load of PCL
and KDK protocols respectively.
2 Related work
In many application scenarios users have to co-operate to achieve specific tasks,
however, they need to know that the that they will send will not be disclosed.
Based on this problem, Yao introduced the concept of secure multiparty compu-
tation was [30]. Despite the huge initial advances [31,15,8,4], only recently did
real-world implementations become practical [24,3,5].
Due to efficiency, secure multiparty computation can be categorized into
schemes that allow arbitrary computations to be performed without leaking
information, and more specialized protocols which allow the private evalua-
tion of particular functions, such as summation. In the first category we have
schemes based on Garbled Circuits (efficient implementations include [22,23,21]),
Nielsen’s protocol using Oblivious Transfer [25] and Oblivious RAM [14,17].
Other protocols use arithmetic circuits such as those based on the BGW proto-
col e.g: VIFF [10] and SPDZ which employs fully homomorphic encryption [11].
As already discussed, the second category includes more application-specific pro-
tocols. For instance for calculating the private sum of n users we have the scheme
of Clifton et al. [9], the two round scheme of Yang et al. [29] and the single round
scheme of Shi et al. but relies on the previously distribution of shares of shares of
zeros from a trusted third party [28]. Other protocols are focused on calculating
one bit multi-party computations, such as DC-net [7,16] and [18].
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Security Definition
We adopt the standard simulation-based definition of security in the semi-honest
model. We base our definition below on Definition 2.1 in [1]. Here we consider
only computational security, and relax the more standard definition to deter-
ministic functionalities with a single output. Note that this definition is general
enough to accommodate multi-round aggregation.
Let m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n be a vector of the inputs from each party and let pi be a
protocol. We define the view of a party Pi in the execution of protocol pi with
input vector m as
VIEWpii (x) = (mi, ri, µ
(1)
i , . . . , µ
(`)
i )
where mi is party P
′
is input, ri is its random coins and µ
(1)
i , . . . , µ
(`)
i are the
` protocol messages it received during the protocol execution. Similarly, the
combined view of a set of I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} parties is denoted by VIEWpiI (x).
Definition 1 (t-privacy of n-party protocols for deterministic aggrega-
tion functionalities). Let f : ({0, 1}∗)n → ({0, 1}∗) be a deterministic n-ary
functionality and let pi be a protocol that correctly computes f . We say that pi
if t-private if for every m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n where |m1| = . . . = |mn|, there exists
a PPT algorithm S such that for every I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t, and every
m ∈ ({0, 1})n where |m1| = . . . = |mn|, it holds that:
{VIEWpiI (m)} ≈
C
{S(I,mI , fI(m))}. (1)
where ≈
C
denotes computational indistinguishability.
3.2 KDK Single-Round Protocol
Kursawe, Danezis and Kohlweiss (KDK) [20] present a specialized multiparty
computation (MPC) protocol for private summation, which is shown is be secure
in the semihonest model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
We refer to this protocol as KDK. In their protocol, n parties P1, . . . , Pn can
compute a joint sum of their inputs m1, . . . ,mn ∈ {0, . . . , β} for some positive
integer β. An overview of their protocol follows.
Let p be a prime. The “public parameters” used in the protocol consist of a
description of a cyclic group G of order p together with a generator g of G. It is
assumed that DDH is intractable in G. These public parameters PP = (G, g, p)
are known to all parties Pi. The group operation of G is written multiplicatively.
1. Setup: Party Pi generates a secret key xi ∈ Zp and computes her public
key ui = g
xi ∈ G. She broadcasts ui.
2. For every r ∈ {1, . . . , `}:
Main Round:
– Party Pi chooses her input mi ∈ {0, . . . , β}.
– Compute w ←∏i−1j∈1 u−1j ·∏nj∈i+1 uj ∈ G.
– Compute vi ← wxi · gmi ∈ G.
– Broadcast vi.
3. Output: The protocol produces an output in {0, . . . , nβ}, namely the sum
of the user inputs. To compute the sum σ:
– Compute z ←∏nj=1 vj .
– Use Pollard’s Lambda algorithm to compute the discrete log σ ∈ {0, . . . , nβ}
of z with respect to g in G. The time complexity of Pollard’s lambda
algorithm is
√
nβ.
– Output σ.
It can be easily observed that
n∏
j=1
vj = g
∑n
j=1mj (2)
3.3 KDK Multi-Round Protocol
If the protocol must be run a number of times, it would be desirable to avoid
re-running the “Setup” phase above which involves each party generating and
broadcasting a new public key; in practice, a verification step for these keys may
also be needed. To re-use the published keys ui, . . . , un for more than a single
round of aggregation, Kursawe et al. propose an extension of their protocol that
facilitates multiple-rounds. In fact, their multi-round protocol accommodates an
unbounded number of rounds. They make use of bilinear pairings to achieve
this. More details on bilinear pairings are provided in Section 4 when we address
practical issues. We give a very brief overview here that is sufficient to understand
the multi-round protocol. The following is based on the definition from [12]
(Section 2).
Definition 2. Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order q. We write
G1 and G2 additively, and GT multiplicatively. A bilinear pairing e : G1×G2 →
GT is an efficiently computable map satisfying
– Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
– Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator for G1 and Q is a generator for G2,
then e(P,Q) 6= 1.
Examples of bilinear pairings (or their modifications) that are used in cryptog-
raphy include the Tate Pairing [2,13], Weil Pairing [6], and Ate Pairing [19].
Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order p. Let e : G1 × G2 →
GT be a cryptographic bilinear pairing meeting the conditions of Definition
2. Furthermore, the Bilinear Decisional Diffie Hellman (BDDH) assumption is
expected to hold with respect to G1, G2, GT and e. Let H2 : Z→ G2 be a hash
function. The main changes to KDK to support multiple rounds are as follows
(optimizations are discussed later):
– The public parameters include generators P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and g = e(P,Q) ∈
GT .
– The public keys are generated as Ui ← xiP ∈ G1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– In round k, party Pi computes
• Qk ← H2(k) ∈ G2 (i.e. for a good choice of H2, we have Qk = rQ for
some uniformly random r, which is intractable to find).
• w ←∏i−1j∈1 e(Uj , Qk)−1 ·∏nj∈i+1 e(Uj , Qk) ∈ GT .
The rest of the protocol remains unchanged except that the computations are
performed in GT , and Pi may choose a different input value in every round.
Naturally, the output of the protocol is then (σ1, . . . , σ`) ∈ {0, . . . , nβ}` if `
rounds are executed.
3.4 PCL Multi-Round Protocol
Patsakis, Clear and Laird [26] introduced another multi-round variant of KDK
without pairings. Their protocol (referred to here as PCL) allows a bounded
number of rounds ` to be performed from the same public key information.
However, ` depends on the acceptable collusion tolerance t ≤ n. Both single-
round and multi-round KDK are t-private for any t ≤ n. On the other hand,
in order for PCL to be t-private, at most ` = bn−t2 c rounds are permitted.
Concretely, for t = n/3 (Byzantine tolerance) and n = 100, we can securely run
33 rounds before re-keying. One of the advantages of PCL is that it only relies on
the DDH assumption in some cyclic group G of prime order p, like single-round
KDK. However, there are also benefits regarding performance over multi-round
KDK as highlighted in Section 4.
It is observed in [26] that KDK is centered on a fixed matrix A with entries
in {−1, 0, 1} that determine the exponents used to compute w. In other words,
party Pi raises Pj ’s public key uj to the power Ai,j when computing w. However,
the matrix A used in KDK has the form: Ai,i = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 0; Ai,j = 1 for
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (+1 in upper triangle) and Ai,j = −1 for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n (−1 in
lower triangle). Therefore, A is skew-symmetric i.e. −A = AT . The main idea in
PCL is to generate a new skew-symmetric matrix A(k) in a deterministic manner
for each round k. Furthermore, the matrix A(k) is chosen to have coefficients in
Zp instead of {−1, 0, 1} in order to prove security. We refer the reader to [26] for
details. Here we assume a function χ : Zp×Z→ Zn×np that takes a random seed
and a round number, and outputs a pseudorandom s kew-symmetric matrix over
Zp. Note that the seed can be pre-determined or derived from the users’ public
keys. The main differences to single-round KDK are as follows:
– Let s ∈ Zp be a seed deterministically derived form u1, . . . , un.
– In round k, party Pi computes
• A(k) ← χ(s, k) ∈ Zn×np .
• w ←∏nj∈1 uA(k)i,jj ∈ Zp.
The remaining steps are the same as single-round KDK with the exception that
each party may choose a different input value in every round, and the final
output is ` values in {0, . . . , nβ}.
4 Comparing the performance of multi-round KDK and
PCL
We begin by comparing the original multi-round KDK from [20] and original
PCL protocol form [26]. We are unaware of any concrete performance results
for multi-round KDK, which we believe are important in order to assess its
practicality. In this section, the performance of both multi-round protocols is
measured and compared. The results motivate our proposed optimizations.
4.1 Computation of a round
Firstly, we compare the necessary group operations that a party Pi must perform
in a given round. Multi-round KDK requires n−1 pairings, n−1 multiplications
in GT and an exponentiation in GT . Note the omission of the inversions in GT
for 1 ≤ j < i. The reason for this is that in the Setup phase, party Pi can
compute Uj ← −Uj for 1 ≤ j < i where Uj ∈ G1 is Pj ’s public key. Thus by
bilinearity of e, no inversions are needed in GT .
On the other hand, PCL needs n exponentiations and n multiplications in
group G, Derivation of the per-round information for KDK involves computing
Qk ← H2(k) ∈ G2 whereas PCL involves computing A(k) ← χ(s, k). However,
the latter can be optimized since only a single row of the matrix A(k) is needed by
party Pi. As pointed out in [26], χ uses a hash function H : Zp×Z×Z×Z→ Zp
to generate A
(k)
i,j ; that is, A
(k)
i,j ← H(s, k, i, j). However, derivation of the per-
round information in both protocols is negligible relative to the cost of the group
operations.
At present, all known efficient realizations of bilinear pairings are based on
elliptic curves. Therefore, in order to implement multi-round KDK, we had to
instantiate G1 and G2 with elliptic curve groups. There is far less freedom when
choosing an elliptic curve when pairings are involved, since the chosen curve must
satisfy additional properties. Notwithstanding, to provide a fair performance
comparison between both protocols, the same curve was used for both protocols.
Consider an elliptic curve E over Fq for prime q whose order is #E(Fq) = p.
For PCL, the group G may be instantiated by the additive group formed by
E(Fq). For multi-round KDK, we have opted to use the Modified Tate Pairing
to instantiate e since efficient implementations exist in libraries such as MIRACL.
Now the embedding degree k of E is the smallest positive integer such that
p | qk−1. Concretely, the Tate pairing takes two points on E(Fqk)[p] and outputs
an element of F∗qk (more precisely, an element of a multiplicative subgroup of
order p of F∗qk), where E(Fqk)[p] denotes the set of points on E(Fqk) of order
p i.e. the set of points A with pA = O, where O is the additive identity (point
at infinity). Basically, G1 and G2 must be two distinct subgroups of E(Fqk) of
order p. In fact, we can set G1 to E(Fq) to make the pairing calculation faster.
Furthermore, certain pairing-friendly curves E allow us to choose G2 such that
it is isomorphic to a subgroup of E′(Fqk/d) where E′ is related to E (known as
the “twisted curve”); this means arithmetic operations can be carried out in the
smaller field Fqk/d where d is the “twist degree”.
The curve chosen for our implementation is a member of the pairing-friendly
BN family from [27] with a 254-bit prime q, embedding degree k = 12, and “twist
degree” d = 6. As a consequence of the latter, arithmetic operations in G2 can
be carried out in Fq2 instead of Fq12 . In addition, GT is the group generated
by g = e(P,Q) ∈ F∗qk , and thus its arithmetic operations are carried out in
the “big” field Fqk . This has implications for message recovery, since Pollard’s
lambda algorithm is much slower.
We implemented both protocols in C++ using the MIRACL C/C++ library
version 51 using the BN curve as described above. The code was compiled with
g++ with the compiler flags “-m64 -O2” as recommended in the MIRACL doc-
1On Github, commit https://github.com/CertiVox/MIRACL/commit/
6d7bb13285e7962ccfa110b4149fa8a63db2ed52
umentation, and was executed on a machine with an Intel Core i5-3340M CPU
(2.7 GHz) and 4GB of RAM, and running 64-bit Debian GNU/Linux 3.2.41.
For each protocol. we measured the time taken to compute a single round per
participant (recall that a round involves preparing the value vi for some party
Pi). We ran this 100 times for different values of n. Note that on each run a ran-
dom index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} was chosen, and the round was executed for Pi. Our
results are shown in Table 4.1. As expected, the cost of a round is roughly linear
in n. Moreover, the difference in times between KDK and PCL is significant;
on average PCL outperforms KDK by a factor of ≈ 437 based on the times in
Table 4.1). For even a moderate number of users such as n = 100, it is clear
that multi-round KDK is not suited to time-sensitive applications. This is more
pronounced for resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensors.
n=10 n=100 n=1000
Multi-round KDK 47.78 (0.25) 480.71 (2.34) 4795.33 (6.69)
PCL 0.94 (0.053) 1.33 (0.01) 5.33 (0.07)
Table 1. Mean time in ms (over 100 runs) for a party to compute a round
(standard deviation in parenthesis).
4.2 Recovery of the sum with Pollard’s Lambda Algorithm
Now we turn our attention to the aggregation phase of the protocol. In any given
round, this entails multiplying all elements vi to calculate z ←
∏
vi, then finding
a discrete logarithm with respect to a generator g to recover the sum σ =
∑
mi of
the parties’ inputs in the round. For this purpose, Pollard’s Lambda algorithm
is employed. In PCL, the vi belong to G whereas in multi-round KDK, they
belong to GT . Recall that our implementation with elliptic curves instantiates
G as E(Fq) whereas GT is instantiated as a subgroup of F∗qk . As such, this phase
is more expensive for multi-round KDK because the field operations take place
in a “bigger” field. Pollard’s Lambda algorithm dominates recovery of the sum.
Its time complexity is O(
√
M) where M denotes the size of the message space.
In this case, M = nβ since each party chooses her message in {0, . . . , β}.
In order to compare multi-round KDK to PCL in this phase, we measured the
time taken to compute Pollard’s Lambda algorithm for different message space
sizes. Moreover, values were randomly generated in the set m
$←− {2b−2, . . . , 2b}
for different values of b and the time taken to recover m given gm using Pol-
lards Lambda algorithm was measured (the range given to the algorithm was
{0, . . . , 2b}); here g denotes the generator of the group in question and multi-
plicative notation is employed arbitrarily. The measurements were performed
in Sage version 5.9 on the same machine and operating system as that used
for the previous experiment above. We ran the experiment 10 times each for
b ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30} for both E(Fq) and the group 〈e(P,Q)〉 ⊂ F∗qk (recall
that k = 12 for the curve we used). Our results are shown in Figure 1. Observe
that for ≈ 30-bit numbers, multi-round KDK takes almost half a minute to re-
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Fig. 1. Average time to find discrete logs in E(Fq) (PCL) and Fqk (multi-round
KDK) for different value ranges (upper bound in bits).
cover the result. Hence, for large values of β, it is the recovery phase that acts
as the main bottlekneck in multi-round KDK.
5 Reducing Computational Load in the PCL Protocol
Although the performance results from Table 4.1 are favorable for PCL, there
is still a motivation for seeking improvements, because many applications in-
volve running the protocol on low-powered devices such as mobile phones. In
particular, when a user’s phone has low battery, it would be desirable to reduce
their computational load. We introduce an optimization that allows parties to
adjust their computational workloads at the expense of reducing their protection
against collusion tolerance. Consider a skew-symmetric matrix A generated in a
particular round of the protocol. Ordinarily, each row of the matrix has n − 1
non-zero entries with overwhelming probability. It is easy to see that the cost of
computing v
(k)
i for some round k is linear in the number of non-zero entries in
the associated matrix A. A user Pi can reduce this cost by setting some entries in
row i of A to zero. Suppose he sets α entries of the i-th row of A to zero; the zero
at Ai,i is not included. His computation time is now
n−1−α
n−1 of the original. For
convenience, we refer to these zeros as holes. If Pi sets a hole at position j, then
Pj necessarily has a hole at position i. So if one party sets α holes, another α
parties enjoy a marginally reduced cost. This idea raises some natural questions
including
1. Since the matrix A is deterministically and non-interactively generated in
each round, how are a party’s holes set?
2. What impact does the number of holes α have on the collusion tolerance of
the protocol? Does this lead to fewer rounds, and how many?
3. For some collusion tolerance t and some desired number of rounds m, how
many users h can simultaneously set α holes while maintaining privacy?
The first question can be addressed by assuming that all parties who seek to
place holes declare this intention in the initial stage of the protocol. We define
the predicate h : {1, . . . , n} → {0, 1} such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have h(i) = 1
if and only if Pi sets holes. For all parties Pi with h(i) = 1, we assume they all
set α holes. The following algorithm is used to compute A in a given round. Note
that we are using a hash function H with seed s effectively as a PRNG2. As such,
we use the notation x
PRNG(H,s)←−−−−−−− X to denote the fact that x is pseudorandomly
sampled from the set X using a pseduorandom function derived from H and s.
1. Set A to the n× n zero matrix.
2. Create an array W of length n; set W [i]← α for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(a) If h(i) = 0, set S ← {i+ 1, . . . , n}.
(b) Else;
i. Set α′ ←W [i].
ii. Choose a subset of {i+ 1, . . . , n} of cardinality α′ (these correspond
to the holes). Formally, sample Sˆ
PRNG(H,s)←−−−−−−− {X ⊆ {i + 1, . . . , n} :
|X| = α′}.
iii. Set W [j]←W [j]− 1 for every j ∈ Sˆ.
iv. Set S ← {i+ 1, . . . , n} \ Sˆ.
(c) For each j ∈ S:
i. Set Ai,j
PRNG(H,s)←−−−−−−− Zp.
ii. set Aj,i ← −Ai,j
It turns out the all parties can set α holes and benefit from a performance
boost. The following lemma gives a lower bound on the number of non-holes
a party must set, and therefore the number of exponentiations in G (viewed
multiplicatively) that have to performed per round (per party) to maintain t-
privacy in the worst-case (this is the number of non-holes plus 1). Recall that n
exponentiations are needed per round in the original PCL protocol.
Lemma 1. Let ` be the number of rounds. Let t < n be the collusion tolerance. A
lower bound on the number of non-holes a party must set per round to guarantee
t-privacy is 2`+ t.
Proof. To derive this lower bound, we consider the worst-case scenario. This
corresponds to the case where all parties choose the same α positions, which all
lie outside the t parties controlled by the adversary.
A skew-symmetric matrix A ∈ Zn×n can be viewed as n quadratic equations
in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Moreover, the i-th row of A represents the equation
2A cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator is not used directly
because the proof of security is in the random oracle model, which relies on H being
modelled as a random oracle.
∑n
j=1Ai,jxixj . There are n(n − 1)/2 unique monomials xixj . There is a corre-
sponding coefficient matrix A′ = coeff(A) ∈ Zn×n(n−1)/2 for A whose i-th row
consists of the coefficients for each monomial. By construction, A′ is linearly
dependant since all n equations must sum to zero to achieve correctness. But,
if we remove one row (say the n-th) to yield A′′, then A′′ should be linearly
independent. This is necessary to ensure security (see the proof of Theorem 1 in
[26] for more details). If we have ` rounds, then the resulting coefficient matrix
C ∈ Z`(n−1)×(n−1)/2p (formed by vertically concatenating the first n − 1 rows
of coeffA(k) for k ≤ `) must be linearly independent to guarantee security. But
by dropping the adversary’s t parties, along with α parties corresponding to the
holes (in the worst-case), we are left with n−t−α parties. A precondition for lin-
ear independence is that ` ≤ n−t−α2 . Since each party must set t+((n−t)−α)+1
non-holes, it follows from the inequality that a lower bound is 2`+ t. uunionsq
Lemma 1 only considers a lower bound. This tell us the best we can hope for.
We explain in the next section why setting the number of non-holes to merely
meet this lower bound is not sufficient for t-privacy.
5.1 Partitioning of the graph
Let A be a skew-symmetric matrix. A can be viewed as an undirected graph
G, where the vertices represent the parties P1, . . . , Pn, and there is an edge
between Pi and Pj if Ai,j 6= 0. If G can be partitioned into more than one
connected component, say components G′1 and G
′
2, then partial sums can be
learned of the parties in both components. It turns out that by just setting
non-holes to merely meet the lower bound given by Lemma 1 is not sufficient to
avoid partitions. Since A is deterministically generated, it might be tempting to
modify the algorithm to generate A such that this does not occur. However, we
don’t know ahead of time which t parties are controlled by the adversary. Let m
the number of non-holes set by each player. From Lemma 1, m ≥ 2`+t. Formally,
to ensure t-privacy, given a connected graph G of degree m, it must hold that
if any κ ≤ t vertices are removed to yield G′, then G′ remains connected. In
fact, such as graph G is referred to as k-vertex-connected, where k in this case is
t+ 1. There are techniques to generate G to satisfy this property. One of those
techniques involve each party linking to its m “nearest neighbors”, where the
distance between Pi and Pj is |j − i|. Therefore, we can change the algorithm
that generates the skew-matrix A to follow this technique. This means that we
can ensure t-privacy and perform only 2`+ t+ 1 exponentiations per round, as
opposed to n in the original protocol.
6 Reducing Computational Load in the KDK Protocol
Due to its comparitively poor performance, as shown in Table 4.1, there is abun-
dant motivation for reducing the computational cost of a round of multi-round
KDK. Our technique from Section 5 can also be applied to multi-round KDK,
although with even greater scope for improvement. The reason for this is as fol-
lows. Recall the coefficient matrix from the proof of Lemma 1. In PCL, n − 1
rows are added to this matrix in every round. However, in multi-round KDK,
due to the pairing, there is no linear relationship between the set of equations of
each round. As such, we only have to consider a single set of n− 1 equations in
isolation. Since there are fewer equations, it is easier to avoid linear dependence,
and more holes can be set as a consequence. Since a skew-symmetric matrix A is
fixed for multi-round KDK, we replace this matrix with one generated according
to the technique mentioned in Section 5.1.
Like above, we consider the worst-case scenario and derive a lower bound on
α. Let us represent the number of dishonest users as a fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of n.
As a necessary condition for linear independence, the following inequality must
be satisfied
((1− τ)n− α)((1− τ)n− α) ≥ 2((1− τ)n− 1). (3)
Since we know that α < (1− τ)n, we can simplify (3) to obtain an upper bound
on α:
α ≤ (τ − 1)n− 1/2√8n− 7− 1/2. (4)
Because there will always be τn non-holes, the number of additional non-holes
that is necessary is d1/2√8n− 7 + 1/2e. It follows that the computational load
as a fraction of the original load is then lower bounded by
τ · n+ d1/2√8n− 7 + 1/2e
n
= τ +
d1/2√8n− 7 + 1/2e
n
(5)
which shows that as n grows, the cost of this modified protocol relative to the
original converges towards τ .
7 Conclusions
While there are several protocols that enable users to privately compute the
summary of their values, in many cases, as in the case of KDK, there are several
hidden implementation bottlenecks which can significantly delay the calculations
of different stages of the protocol. In this work we indicate that for instance the
multi-round KDK protocol, due its heavy reliance on pairings is not practical at
present for large numbers of users n > 100, whereas PCL is highly practical in
these cases at the expense of reduced collusion tolerance. We showed that further
customization of the privacy level facilitates further extensions to both protocols,
and such extensions were shown to be secure. If applied, these extension can
boost the efficiency of both these protocols, leading to faster applications with
customizable levels of privacy.
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